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Abstract 
 
For much of the 20th century, economic growth was fueled by cheap oil-based energy 
supply. Due to increasing resource constraints, however, the political and strategic 
importance of oil has become a significant part of energy and foreign policy making in 
East and Southeast Asian countries. In Japan, the rise of China’s economic and military 
power is a source of considerable concern. To enhance energy security, the Japanese 
government has recently amended its energy regulatory framework, which reveals high 
political awareness of risks resulting from the looming key resources shortage and 
competition over access. An essential understanding that national energy security is a 
politically and economically sensitive area with a clear international dimension 
affecting everyday life is critical in shaping a nation’s energy future 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The struggles over the world's energy and mineral resources have often provided 
impetus for conflicts between nations, whether of a limited local or regional scope or 
world-wide. The rich resources of East and Southeast Asia were highly sought after by 
Imperial Japan to support its industrial and military expansion program in the aftermath 
of the Meiji-Restoration (Meiji ishin, 1868). After hundreds of years of seclusion from 
the outside world during the Tokugawa period (1603-1854), Japan emerged as the first 
Asian industrialized nation, and the need for raw materials and markets expanded as the 
Japanese economy grew. As a rapidly industrializing country with a very limited 
natural resource endowment Japan became highly dependent upon seaborne trade and 
the free movement of shipping for its well being. Japan’s ambitions on the East Asian 
mainland and in Southeast Asia and its military capability to advance them grew 
rapidly as well. As a “rich country with a strong army” (fukoku kyhei), military 
expenditure was a priority and made Japan itself for the first time a colonial power.
1 
Japanese colonialism and rising ultra-nationalism culminated in the idea to develop the 
Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai Ta Kyeiken,) in the 1930s; a mutually 
cooperative and self-sufficient economic and political region under exclusive Japanese 
leadership, intended to reshape the western-dominated world order.  
 
“The dream of the Co-Prosperity Sphere offered a way out of the economic 
impasse that Japan faced as a rapidly industrializing economy with a limited 
resource base and stressed the commonalities of economic interest among the 
people of Asia as much as the cultural commonalities as a vision of regional 
unity.”
2 
 
                                                 
1  See Janet E. Hunter, The Emergence of Modern Japan. An Introductory History 
since 1853 (London; New York: Longman, 1989), Chapter 12 “The Role of the 
Military”. 
2   See Peter Duus, “The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere: Dream and 
Reality”, Journal of Northeast Asian History 5, 1 (June 2008), 143-154. 6 
 
Japan’s international relations with its neighbors are still today burdened with the 
legacy of its wartime geopolitics. At the same time, in a context of growing global 
competition for natural resources, it is important to identify the national and 
transnational dimensions of energy security related risks and increase awareness of the 
interconnectedness of the energy issue with the current resurgence of geopolitics. This 
paper places Japan’s energy security issues into the context of a changing geopolitical 
landscape and gives an overview of Japan’s responses to this issue. 
 
 
2.   Changing Geopolitics and Energy Security Issues 
 
The term “geopolitics” basically refers to “the study of the geographical distribution of 
power among states across the world, especially the rivalry between the major 
powers.”
3 It is concerned with their external strategies to produce a global balance of 
power and the rise and fall of great powers. Whereas geopolitical thinking in the early 
20th century, authoritatively developed by Sir Halford J. Mackinder, Karl Haushofer or 
Nicholas J. Spykman
4, has inextricably linked interstate rivalry to the struggle for 
ideological and military supremacy, in the post-Cold War era and under conditions of 
globalization economic strength has gained importance as a major source of power. 
China’s increasing economic weight in the world has already changed the global 
balance of power, and it has major consequences for global energy supply and demand. 
Thus, competition over access to natural resources is a geopolitical phenomenon with 
strategic importance in international relationships. The territorial control, exploitation 
and commercialization of natural resources are increasingly becoming the focus of 
geopolitical strategies and policy responses relating to energy security. With regard to 
                                                 
3   See Colin Flint and Peter Taylor, Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-
State and Locality (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2007), 318. 
4   See Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, “Kampf um Lebensraum. Karl Haushofers ‚Geo-
politik‘ und der Nationalsozialismus“, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 25.8.1979,  
17-29; Halford J. Mackinder, “The geographical pivot of history”, Geographical 
Journal 23 (1904), 421-442;  Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944). 7 
 
oil, this has to do with M. King Hubbert’s Peak Oil Theory, predicting that the 
economic importance of oil will ultimately decline in the 21st century due to the 
decline of global reserves.
5 The sources of oil that remain to be discovered are likely to 
be relatively smaller and more expensive to exploit and 

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East Asia is the fastest-growing economic region in the world, rapidly integrating 
through trade, foreign direct investment and the transfer of knowledge and technologies. 
The demand for oil, in particular, is still growing and East Asian countries are heavily 
reliant on oil imports (see Figure 1, 2). Oil consumption has increased more than twice 
as fast in East and Southeast Asia between 1999 and 2009 as in the world as a whole.
7  
The main reasons are economic growth, industrialization and urbanization, demand for 
mobility increases and rising standards of living. During the same period, however, oil 
production has remained relatively flat. The result is that the region has become heavily 
dependent on oil imports to meet its growing demand. Most oil comes from the Middle 
East, which is one of the most politically volatile regions in the world. Highly 
industrialized countries like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan rely almost exclusively on 
oil imports to meet their consumption needs. Even China as one of the region’s major 
oil producers has become net oil importer since 1993, most of its imports coming from 
the Middle East. Only Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam are net exporters of oil.
8  
                                                 
5   See Steve Connor, “Warning: Oil supplies are running out fast”, The Independent, 
August 3,2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/warning-oil-supplies-
are-running-out-fast-1766585.html (accessed October 8, 2010). 
6   See Antony Froggatt and Michael A. Levi, “Climate and energy security policies 
and measures: synergies and conflicts”, International Affairs 85, 6 (2009), 1129-
1141. 
7   See BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010, http://bp.com/ 
statisticalreview (accessed October 1, 2010). 
8   See Kang Wu et.al., “Oil in Asia and the Pacific: Production, Consumption, Imports, 
and Policy Options”, Analysis from the East-West Center No. 85 (August 2008), 6. 8 
 
Figure 1: Anticipated global energy demand by region, 2030 
 
 
 
Data source: Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Energy in Japan 2008, 
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/energy-in-japan/english2008.pdf (accessed 
October 7, 2010) 
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Figure 2: Gross domestic product and share of economic sectors in East and 
Southeast Asian countries 2008 
 
 
 
Data sources: Fischer Weltalmanach 2011, DGBAS (Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Taiwan) National Statistics, 
http://eng.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=5 (accessed February 1, 2010) 
 
 
However, the fact that East and Southeast Asia’s proved reserves of oil are the lowest 
among the world’s major regions
9 is of great strategic importance with regard to future 
geopolitical risks linked to resource nationalism. 
 
                                                 
9   See BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010, http://bp.com/ 
statisticalreview (accessed October 1, 2010). 10 
 
Energy security is, thus, related to the potential vulnerability of rising resource supply 
dependence, the security of access to resources, and the risk of supply interruptions and 
price manipulation. The increasing weight of new leading actors in international 
relations could create new tensions in international energy-related power politics in the 
coming years. 
 
 
3.   Japan’s Responses to the Energy Security Issue 
 
Let us sketch Japan’s responses to the energy security issue and link them to the more 
general geopolitical issues of resource access and China’s emergence as a new major 
rival. After World War Two, the Japanese economy not only recovered rapidly from 
severe damage but also surpassed the growth rates of earlier times during the period of 
high economic growth (1952-1965).
10 Rapid economic development happened though 
Japan lacked major natural resources, desperately needed for growing industrial 
production outputs. The objective of MITI’s (Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry) industrial policy was to shift investment to specific key industries in order to 
gain international competitive advantage for Japanese corporations. The iron and steel, 
shipbuilding and petrochemical industries required large-scale import of raw materials. 
Geographical concentration of these industries and the realization of agglomeration 
economies on reclaimed land on Japan’s Pacific Coast was one key factor for their 
success. The ubiquitous availability and relatively low prices of raw materials in the 
world market was another factor. Owing to the exploration and exploitation of huge 
new oil fields in the Middle East since the late 1950s, low-priced crude oil was 
beginning to flow into Japan and to replace coal as Japan’s major source of energy.  
 
The situation changed after the oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s when supply 
disruptions became a major risk for Japan. The key energy and security policy targets 
were to reduce the risks of oil supply disruptions, to diversify oil import sources and to 
change the country’s energy mix. Before the oil crises, oil supplied 77 per cent of the 
                                                 
10  See Takafusa Nakamura, Lectures on Modern Japanese Economic History 1926–
1994 (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1994). 11 
 
nation’s primary energy needs. This ratio is now less than 50 per cent, but overall the 
carbon based fossil energy sources oil, coal, and natural gas still provide 83 per cent of 
Japan’s primary energy supply (see Figure 3).
11 Moreover, Japan exhibits a total energy 
import dependency rate of 80 per cent leaving the country vulnerable to the potential of 
supply disruptions.  
 
Japan takes a diversity of initiatives for ensuring energy security these days. Strategic 
oil stocks equivalent to at least 70 days of net oil imports (168 days of domestic 
consumption respectively) are maintained by private oil companies and JOGMEC 
(Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation), a Japanese government independent 
administrative institution that manages Japan's national stockpiling of oil, Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG) and rare metals programs.
12 Among other activities, JOGMEC 
manages ten national oil stockpiling bases on the coasts of northeastern and 
southwestern Japan. 
 
Concerns about oil-dependency, climate change and cuts in carbon emissions were 
leading to a new legislative initiative. Based on the “Basic Act on Global Warming 
Countermeasures” (Chiky ondanka taisaku no suishin ni kan suru hritsu), approved 
by the Cabinet in March 2010, the Japanese government specified its goal of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 25 per cent from 1990 levels by 2020. Basic domestic 
policy measures to achieve the reduction target include the following: 
 
  the establishment of a domestic emission trading scheme; the promotion of the 
use of renewable energy, including the introduction of a feed-in tariff system for 
all types of renewable energy;  
 
                                                 
11  For more detailed data see Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Energy in 
Japan 2008, http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/energy-in-japan/english2008.pdf 
(accessed October 7, 2010). 
12  See JOGMEC’s homepage at http://www.jogmec.go.jp/english/activities/ 
stockpiling_oil/index.html (accessed October 8, 2010). 12 
 
Figure 3: Primary energy consumption of East and Southeast Asian countries by 
fuel, 2009 
 
 
 
Data source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010, 
http://bp.com/statisticalreview (accessed October 1, 2010). 
 
 
  the promotion of increased energy efficiency including the development of 
Smart Grids;  
  the development and deployment of innovative technologies in the energy sector 
such as clean coal-fired plants, IGCC (Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle) 
power plants with CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) capability and the 
commercialization of fast breeder nuclear power reactors;  
  the promotion of long-term energy research to develop new sources of future 
energy supply (e.g. fusion energy);  13 
 
  the strengthening of international partnership for mitigation and adaptation to 
climate change.  
 
With regard to nuclear energy, the new “Basic Plan on Energy” (Enerug kihon 
keikaku), published by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in June 
2010, includes construction of nine new reactors by 2020 and more than 14 new 
reactors by 2030.
13 
 
Despite being the only country to have suffered the devastating effects of nuclear 
weapons during World War Two, Japan has embarked on programs to promote the 
peaceful use of nuclear technology (see Figure 4). Today, nuclear energy accounts for 
about 13 per cent of the country’s primary energy supply and 30 per cent of its total 
electricity production. Efforts are being made to acquire a complete nuclear fuel cycle, 
including reprocessing of used nuclear fuel. Local residents frequently oppose the 
construction of nuclear facilities in their community, showing an attitude which is well-
known as the NIMBY (“Not In My Backyard”) syndrome, although the importance of 
nuclear energy is widely accepted among the general public. Due to public resentments 
concerning the siting of nuclear facilities, the government and the energy supply 
companies have developed a highly sophisticated, institutionalized compensation 
system being flexible and adaptive and reducing the uncertainties of bargaining 
processes.
14  
 
                                                 
13  See Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Enerug kihon keikaku, 
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/kihonkeikaku/100618honbun.pdf (accessed 
October 7, 2010). 
14  See Daniel P. Aldrich, Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan 
and the West (2nd edition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). For the 
limits of the compensation system, see Daniel P. Aldrich, “The Limits of Flexible 
and Adaptive Institutions: The Japanese Government’s Role in Nuclear Power Plant 
Siting over the Post War Period”, in S. Hayden Lesbirel and Daigee Shaw, eds., 
Managing Conflict in Facility Siting (Cheltenham; Northampton: Edward Elgar 
2005), 109-133. 14 
 
Figure 4: Nuclear power plants and facilities for uranium enrichment, fuel 
fabrication, reprocessing and storage of radioactive materials in Japan 
 
 
 
Data source: World Nuclear Association, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 
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Figure 5: Nuclear power related public relations activities by Japan Atomic 
Energy Relations Organization (JAERO) 
 
 
 
Source: JAERO, http://www.jaero.or.jp/ (accessed June 20, 2008) 
 
 
Although hosting cities are highly subsidized based on this compensation system, 
campaigns against new nuclear facilities are no exception. Consequently, Japan’s 
nuclear siting policy is based on the expansion of existing sites, not on the development 
of new ones, and promoting nuclear energy as a safe and secure contribution to ensure 
the country’s energy security (e.g. Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization, see 
Figure 5). 
 
In order to meet their increasing energy demands, some East and Southeast Asian 
countries are building and planning new nuclear power reactors. Based on the 
availability of modern technology, Japan’s nuclear power industry seeks to participate 
in the growing markets, especially in China. The diffusion of nuclear technology is 
difficult to control. The regional nuclear energy market is growing, but problems like 
proneness to natural disasters (earthquakes, tsunami) and reactor safety, political-
military affairs, export controls for dual-use nuclear technologies and non-proliferation 
as well as nuclear waste storage are remaining unsolved. These are very important 16 
 
aspects of Japan’ relations with East and Southeast Asia with relevance for all the key 
players: energy corporations; policy-makers; international and non-governmental 
organizations. In face of the problems associated with nuclear energy use, one might 
ask whether development as a “catch-up” process in which less developed countries 
take advantage of the technological paths previously forged by more developed 
countries is anything favourable and desirable in the case of nuclear energy use. This 
shared conception of developmental catch-up is seriously criticized because it is a 
technological-determinism and an uncritical stance towards potential hazards. The 
background to the increasing use of nuclear power is, of course, the increasing number 
of conflicts over energy and other natural resources around the world which indicates 
that resource development still is an important economic activity. 
 
 
4.   The Maritime Dimensions of Japan’s Energy Security 
 
With regard to oil supply, increasing demands and a greater reliance on foreign oil are 
spurring offshore exploration for new sources of oil production. Japanese oil companies 
are primarily involved in projects in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. This leads us 
to considering additional international dimensions of energy security with regard to 
maritime strategic trends in the Asia-Pacific. Japan and most of the East and Southeast 
Asian states have claims and counterclaims on the right to establish exclusive economic 
zones (EEZ) in parts of the East China Sea and the South China Sea, originating from 
ambiguous provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).
15 Though usually ancillary to more fundamental geopolitical issues, such 
conflicts sometimes become central to international military and diplomatic affairs.  
 
The ongoing dispute over ownership of the Senkaku ( chin. Diaoyu) Islands between 
Japan, China and Taiwan is symbolic of the very fundamental economic and political 
                                                 
15  For details in the context of East Asia see Zou Keyuan, Law of the Sea in East Asia. 
Issues and Prospects (London; New York: Routledge, 2005). Gaye Christofferson, 
“Japan and the East Asian Maritime Security Order: Prospects for trilateral and 
Multilateral Cooperation”, Asian Perspective 33, 3 (2009), 107-149.  17 
 
power struggle. In the second quarter of 2010, Japan lost its place to China as the 
world’s second-largest economy in terms of nominal gross domestic product. Uneasy 
perceptions of the economic, diplomatic and military rise of China are no exception 
among its neighbors and a major risk to regional stability. In fact, China as an emerging 
superpower has vital interests to protect which are no longer solely domestic, but 
rapidly expanding beyond the region. China is stressing its maritime interests, in 
particular, by heavy investment in its naval force. Mao Zedong’s Theory of the Three 
Worlds, which was presented by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping at the UN General 
Assembly in 1974, has long been discarded by the post-Mao leadership.
16  
 
The Strait of Malacca is a symbol of the vulnerability of Japan’s energy security. It is 
one of the most important shipping routes in the world. For centuries, it has been part of 
the Arab trade routes linking the Middle East with Southeast and East Asia. Singapore, 
located at the southern tip of the Strait of Malacca (see Photo), developed into a key 
nodal point of the Indian Ocean–Strait of Malacca–South China Sea–Pacific Ocean 
trade route. Competition between the great powers for access to these straits will 
remain an integral part of future geopolitics. The strait leads to the South China Sea and 
serves as major choke point for a significant share of world trade including mineral and 
other natural resources. More than 90 per cent of oil imports into Asia and the Pacific 
are transported by sea tanker through this strait.
17 The capacity of the various nations in 
the region to control navigation, project military power and conduct naval operations 
has become increasingly important. The security interests of extra-regional powers like 
                                                 
16  See Herbert S. Yee, “The Three World theory and post-Mao China’s global 
strategy”, International Affairs 59, 2 (1983), 239-249. The concept identified the 
two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union, as the First World; 
the developing countries as the Third World; and the developed countries between 
the two as the Second World. China declared itself belonging to the Third World, 
never seeking to become a superpower. 
17 See Kang Wu et al., “Oil in Asia and the Pacific: Production, Consumption, Imports, 
and Policy Options”, Analysis from the East-West Center No. 85 (August 2008), 6. 18 
 
the United States and Russia are also involved. China is under suspect as to seize sole 
control of the shipping traffic in the region and building-up its military capabilities.
18 
 
 
Photo: Singapore and harbor, at the southern gateway to the Strait of Malacca 
 
 
 
Source: Malacca, Strait of. Photograph. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, http://media-
2.web.britannica.com/eb-media/69/93569-050-949C2CDA.jpg (accessed October 26, 
2010) 
 
 
What makes the situation most complicated is the fact that the conflicting claims over 
maritime space are fueled not only by resource rivalries but also by historical 
unresolved grief and resurgent nationalism. The common understanding that peace is 
                                                 
18  On the maritime history of Asian seas see James R. Holmes, “The Twentieth 
Century: Asia Returns to the Sea”, Education About Asia 14, 3 (Winter 2009), 31-
36.  19 
 
simply too important, however, may be the catalyst necessary for political leaders to 
reduce tensions and to stabilize the relations between countries.  
 
 
5.   Conclusion: Energy Policies for Peaceful Co-existence  
 
What else can be done to improve the situation? More emphasis needs to be placed on 
the role of preventive diplomacy and the creation of new institutions for dispute 
management and conflict prevention on a regional rather than a global level. Practical 
compromises, including joint development of resources in disputed areas, a universal 
commitment to freedom of passage through international straits, technology transfer 
and more multilateral and bilateral cooperation on energy issues (e.g. ASEAN Plan of 
Action on Energy Cooperation; Pacific Energy Summit) might offer opportunities to 
enhance energy security and political stability collectively. Japan’s advanced energy 
and environmental technologies, in particular, could serve as a bridge to enable Asian 
nations to reduce their energy consumption and stimulate more cooperative 
international relations. However, some countries in the region seem to be less 
concerned about their ties to each other than about intensifying links with resource-rich 
countries in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere.
19 China’s engagement in Africa is 
the most prominent example and illustrates the reality of a rapidly changing world. 
Many western countries have already criticized China’s neo-colonial policy for Africa, 
neglecting the existence of illegitimate regimes, corruption and human rights abuse in 
favor of access to natural resources.
20 
 
                                                 
19 See Kang Wu et al., “Oil in Asia and the Pacific: Production, Consumption, Imports, 
and Policy Options”, Analysis from the East-West Center No. 85 (August 2008), 9. 
20  On “China in Africa” see Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of 
China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). John Ghazvinian, 
Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, 2007). 20 
 
“Asia is resuming its central place in world politics, at sea as in other fields of 
endeavour”
21 – and the questions being asked over energy security are global in 
consequence. Both cooperation and competition among the countries, concerned with 
the looming end of the cheap fossil fuel age, will continue to coexist.  Both Japan and 
China, bound together by strong economies ties, will surely play an important role for a 
stable regional order. They have no interest of military conflict because the economic 
effects would be unpredictable. An integrated strategy aiming at decarbonising energy 
to reduce the depend on fossil fuels, including a proactive nuclear and renewable 
energy policy, decreased energy demand through energy efficiencyand increased 
investment in energy research and development activities forms an essential part of 
Japan’s energy future. With regard to the overall economic structure, the critical trend 
is from natural resources to the knowledge economy. Japan’s vulnerability, however, 
remains an important aspect of the geopolitical reality for the time being. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21  James R. Holmes, “The Twentieth Century: Asia Returns to the Sea”, Education 
About Asia 14, 3 (Winter 2009), 36. 2122 
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